"The Great Taking"

A Summary of the Book by David Rogers Webb - Article #78

In this 18-minute article, The X Project will answer these questions:

• I. Why this article now, who is the author, and what does Chapter I tell us?

• II. What does Chapter II on “Dematerialization” say?

• III. What does Chapter III tell us about “Security Entitlement”?

• IV. What does Chapter IV on “Harmonization” tell us?

• V. What does Chapter V on “Collateral Management” say?

• VI. Chapter VI, “Safe Harbor for Whom, and from What?”

• VII. What does Chapter VII say about “Central Clearing Parties”?

• VIII. What does Chapter VIII, “Bank Holiday,” tell us"?

• IX. What does Chapter IX on “The Great Deflation” say?

• X What does Chapter X, the “Conclusion,” tell us?

• XI. What does The X Project Guy have to say?

• XII. Why should you care?

Reminder for readers and listeners: nothing The X Project writes or says should be considered investment advice or recommendations to buy or sell securities or investment products. Everything written and said is for informational purposes only, and you should do your own research and due diligence. It would be best to discuss with an investment advisor before making any investments or changes to your investments based on any information provided by The X Project.

I. Why is this article now? Who is the author, and what does Chapter I tell us?

I am writing this article because I recently read The Great Taking, a provocative and disturbing book. This article is also timely because we have seen a lot of market volatility recently, which can be a symptom of systemic instability. If and when we experience the next great financial crisis, everyone who has investment assets should be aware of the possibility of what this book describes. While I think everyone should read this book (free link to download PDF here) or at least watch the documentary based on this book on YouTube, I know most will not, so this article is a bit longer with two additional sections as I go into greater detail, summarizing the book chapter by chapter. Also, there is no paywall for this article, making it available in its entirety to free subscribers.

Based on the prologue of "The Great Taking," the author, David Rogers Webb, presents himself as a deeply reflective and concerned individual with a long history of engagement in financial markets and business and an understanding of global power structures. He describes his life as one shaped by significant historical events and personal experiences that have led him to a profound understanding of the forces at play in the world, particularly those related to financial systems and economic control.

The author recounts his early experiences growing up during a period of industrial decline in Cleveland, witnessing firsthand the collapse of family businesses and the broader economic devastation that followed. These formative experiences, combined with his education and career in finance, seem to have driven him to a relentless pursuit of understanding the hidden mechanisms behind economic and financial developments.

Webb’s career trajectory took him from working in high-stress financial environments on Wall Street to managing significant hedge funds and engaging with some of the most influential financial figures, such as George Soros. Throughout his career, he developed a deep skepticism of the narratives presented by mainstream economic and political leaders, eventually leading him to question and investigate the underlying structures of the global financial system.

The prologue also reveals Webb as a person who has felt a strong sense of responsibility to his family and the broader public to expose what he perceives as a deliberate and systematic erosion of personal and property rights. His writing is motivated by a desire to share his knowledge and insights, warning others of the dangers he sees in the world's current financial and economic trajectory.

Chapter I of "The Great Taking," titled "Introduction," sets the stage for the book’s exploration of a global financial and economic strategy that the author believes is leading to the largest asset confiscation in history. The chapter introduces the concept of a "hybrid war"—a conflict waged not through traditional military means but through financial manipulation, deception, and the systematic erosion of personal and property rights.

The author argues that this strategy, which has been developing for decades, is designed to centralize control over all financial assets, including money, stocks, bonds, and real estate. The chapter emphasizes that this is not a random or natural economic cycle but a carefully planned operation by powerful entities controlling central banks, governments, and major corporations.

The introduction also outlines the book's main themes, warning that the culmination of these efforts will result in the massive loss of individual property ownership. The chapter serves as a wake-up call, urging readers to recognize the signs of this ongoing "Great Taking" and understand the broader implications for society and individual freedom.

II. What does Chapter II on “Dematerialization” say?

The second chapter, titled "Dematerialization," explores the historical and strategic processes that led to the transformation of securities from physical certificates to electronic or "book-entry" forms. This shift is portrayed as a critical step in the broader strategy to centralize control over financial assets globally, with implications for property rights.

The chapter suggests that the dematerialization process was not a mere technological evolution but a deliberate move orchestrated by powerful entities, including the CIA. The key figure in this narrative is William Dentzer Jr., a former CIA operative appointed as the Chairman and CEO of the Depository Trust Corporation (DTC) despite lacking a background in banking. Dentzer's leadership at the DTC played a crucial role in the transition from handling physical stock certificates to managing securities through computerized entries. The author raises suspicions that the so-called "paperwork crisis" of the 1960s, which purportedly necessitated the shift to electronic securities, may have been a manufactured pretext to push forward the dematerialization agenda.

The implications of this shift are profound, as it effectively removed property rights from individual securities holders. By converting securities into electronic entries managed by central depositories, ownership became abstracted and centralized, paving the way for the potential mass confiscation of collateral. The chapter argues that this move was essential in establishing the infrastructure for future financial manipulation and control.

III. What does Chapter III tell us about “Security Entitlement”?

In Chapter III, the author delves into the concept of "security entitlement," which is presented as a deceptive legal construct that has fundamentally altered the nature of property rights in financial assets. The chapter begins with an analogy comparing the situation to buying a car but being unaware that the dealership has the right to use the car as collateral for its loans, putting the buyer at risk of losing the car if the dealership goes bankrupt. This analogy illustrates how security entitlement has been used to strip investors of actual ownership of their financial assets.

Historically, financial instruments were considered personal property under the law. However, introducing the security entitlement concept means that investors traditionally no longer "own" the securities. Instead, they hold a security entitlement against the financial institution that holds the actual securities. This subtle but significant shift means that in the event of the institution's insolvency, the investors' claims to their assets are at risk. The assets may be treated as part of the institution's collateral, subject to claims by its creditors.

The chapter emphasizes the systemic risks posed by the widespread adoption of security entitlements, particularly in the global derivatives market. The practice of rehypothecation, where the same collateral is used multiple times across different transactions, has created a precarious situation in which the actual ownership of assets is obscured, and multiple parties may lay claim to the same underlying assets.

The author warns that in a financial crisis, these legal constructs will likely lead to widespread loss of assets by individuals and smaller investors as secured creditors and larger financial institutions assert their prioritized claims. The chapter concludes by painting a grim picture of a future financial collapse where many investors will find themselves without recourse, having been misled into believing they owned assets that others controlled.

IV. What does Chapter IV on “Harmonization” tell us?

This chapter explores the intricate and deliberate process of aligning global legal frameworks to favor secured creditors, particularly within the realm of financial securities. The chapter argues that harmonizing these laws was not merely about improving international financial cooperation but rather about centralizing control over financial assets globally, often at the expense of individual property rights.

The chapter opens by quoting Sun Tzu, emphasizing the strategic nature of harmonization as a tactic powerful financial entities use to manipulate global financial systems. The author contends that the push for harmonization, particularly in the aftermath of financial crises like the dot-com bust, was driven by a manufactured imperative to secure creditor claims on a global scale. The concept of "legal certainty" for creditors became a rallying cry used to justify sweeping changes in how financial collateral is managed and controlled across borders.

One of the key developments discussed is the "Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held with an Intermediary," signed in 2006. This international treaty aimed to remove legal uncertainties in cross-border securities transactions by introducing the "Place of the Relevant Intermediary Approach" (PRIMA). PRIMA allowed the law governing securities transactions to be determined by the intermediary's location rather than the actual securities' location. This shift was critical in sidestepping national laws that protected investors' property rights, effectively allowing secured creditors to take control of assets with fewer legal obstacles.

The chapter also highlights the role of various financial institutions and legal experts, such as James S. Rogers, who played a significant part in drafting these harmonization efforts. Rogers, for instance, was involved in revising Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which laid the groundwork for the modern system of electronic, book-entry securities holdings. This revision was pivotal in transforming how securities are owned and transferred, making them more susceptible to being used as collateral in ways that favor large financial institutions.

Harmonization was not without resistance. The chapter notes that the European Union (EU), for instance, did not sign the Hague Convention due to conflicts with existing European laws that strongly protected property rights under the principle of lex rei sitae (the law of the place where the property is located). However, the EU eventually adopted measures that aligned with the objectives of the Convention, such as the Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral arrangements. This directive ensured that specific provisions of insolvency law, which could impede the realization of financial collateral, would not apply, thus facilitating the use of securities as collateral across borders.

The chapter then delves into the consequences of these legal changes, particularly in Europe. It explains how harmonization led to the subversion of property rights in countries like Sweden and Finland, where legal reforms in 2014 aligned their systems with the U.S. model. This alignment allowed for the pooling of securities in ways that could expose them to risks, such as insolvency, without explicit consent or even the knowledge of the asset holders.

The author concludes by reflecting on the broader implications of harmonization, suggesting that it represents a systematic betrayal of public trust by governments and financial institutions. The chapter portrays harmonization as a process used to erode individual property rights in favor of a global financial system that prioritizes the interests of a select group of secured creditors. This shift has made it increasingly difficult for individual investors to safeguard their assets, leaving them vulnerable to potential losses in a financial crisis.

V. What does Chapter V on “Collateral Management” say?

The Role of Collateral Management Systems

The chapter begins by explaining the essential role of collateral management systems in the modern financial landscape. These systems are designed to provide a "single view" of all available securities held by a financial institution's clients, regardless of where those securities are physically located. This aggregated view is crucial for efficiently deploying securities to meet collateral obligations, particularly in the complex and rapidly changing world of financial derivatives.

These systems allow for the seamless movement of collateral across different jurisdictions through links between local Central Securities Depositories (CSDs) and International Central Securities Depositories (ICSDs). The ICSDs act as Collateral Management Service Providers (CMSPs), which have access to a participant's entire portfolio of securities, including those held via link arrangements with other CSDs. This structure enables the rapid reallocation of collateral to meet margin requirements at Central Clearing Counterparties (CCPs) or to be pledged to central banks during market volatility.

Collateral Transformation and Rehypothecation

Much of the chapter is devoted to "collateral transformation," a process where ineligible or less desirable securities are exchanged for those that meet the criteria needed to fulfill collateral obligations. This transformation is part of a broader strategy involving rehypothecation client assets. Rehypothecation allows the same underlying collateral to be reused multiple times across different financial transactions, creating a daisy chain of obligations that vastly exceeds the actual value of the underlying assets.

The chapter argues that this collateral transformation and rehypothecation system is inherently risky and does not benefit the clients whose assets are involved. Instead, it primarily benefits the large financial institutions that dominate the derivatives markets. These institutions can leverage client assets as collateral without the clients' explicit knowledge or consent, leading to multiple claims on the same assets in the event of a financial crisis, potentially leaving the original asset holders with nothing.

Systemic Risk and the "Everything Bubble"

The author warns that the very design of these collateral management systems, particularly their automation and standardization, could lead to a catastrophic outcome in a market-wide financial crisis. The chapter suggests that these systems are a crucial component of what is referred to as the "Everything Bubble," an unsustainable expansion of financial assets that far exceeds the underlying real-world economic activity.

When this bubble bursts, the automated systems will quickly sweep all available collateral to the CCPs and central banks, leaving smaller investors and less privileged creditors with little to no recourse. The chapter predicts that this could trigger an "Everything Crash," where the value of all financial assets plummets, and the centralized systems rapidly move assets to cover the losses of the largest financial institutions, effectively wiping out the wealth of countless individuals.

A Deliberate Strategy

The chapter asserts that this entire collateral management framework has been deliberately constructed over decades as part of a broader strategy to concentrate financial power in a few large institutions. This strategy, the author argues, has been executed with full knowledge of its potential to cause widespread harm in the event of a financial collapse. The chapter paints a grim picture of the future, where the fallout from the "Everything Crash" will devastate economies worldwide, with no pockets of resilience remaining.

VI. Chapter VI, “Safe Harbor for Whom, and from What?”

This chapter critically examines the changes to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbor" provisions and their far-reaching implications for financial markets and individual investors. It argues that these provisions, significantly expanded in 2005, have been designed to protect large financial institutions at the expense of smaller creditors and the general public, particularly in financial crises.

Background on Safe Harbor Provisions

The "safe harbor" provisions in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code are legal mechanisms that protect certain financial transactions from being unwound by a bankruptcy court. Initially intended to ensure market stability by allowing the swift settlement of trades and minimizing the risk of systemic failure, these provisions have been expanded over time to cover various financial contracts, including securities contracts, commodities contracts, forward contracts, repurchase agreements, and swap agreements.

In 2005, less than two years before the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act was enacted, significantly broadening the scope of these safe harbor provisions. The chapter suggests that while these changes were marketed as necessary to protect the stability of financial markets, they primarily served to ensure that secured creditors—particularly large financial institutions—could seize collateral with impunity, even in cases where such actions would have previously been considered fraudulent.

The Impact on Financial Markets

The chapter explains that the safe harbor provisions allow financial institutions to close positions and demand collateral from distressed firms almost immediately, bypassing the usual bankruptcy protections that would otherwise slow down this process. While this rapid action is intended to prevent a domino effect of failures among financial institutions, the author argues that it exacerbates the problems it seeks to avoid. By allowing a rush to close out positions, these provisions can contribute to the failure of already weakened firms, triggering broader market instability.

A key example provided is the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008. In the lead-up to its collapse, JP Morgan (JPM), which acted as both a secured creditor and custodian of Lehman’s client assets, took advantage of the safe harbor provisions to seize these assets. Under normal circumstances, this would have been seen as a fraudulent transfer, but the safe harbor rules protected JPM from any legal consequences. The court ruling in favor of JPM set a precedent reinforcing the absolute priority of large financial institutions to claim client assets during bankruptcy, further entrenching the power of these entities within the financial system.

Consequences for Smaller Creditors and Investors

The chapter argues that these legal protections create a two-tiered system in bankruptcy proceedings, where "protected" financial participants—essentially large financial institutions—can secure their interests at the expense of smaller creditors and investors. This disparity is further compounded by the fact that the same rules do not apply to smaller secured creditors, who may not have the same legal recourse or ability to recover their claims.

The result is a legal environment where the most powerful financial institutions are effectively insulated from the consequences of their actions. At the same time, smaller investors and creditors are left to bear the brunt of financial collapses. This situation, the author contends, undermines the principles of fairness and equity that bankruptcy law is supposed to uphold.

A System Designed to Benefit the Few

The chapter concludes by asserting that the safe harbor provisions were not just a response to market needs but were deliberately crafted to benefit a specific class of financial institutions. By ensuring that these institutions could act without fear of legal repercussions during financial crises, the provisions have helped entrench these entities' power within the global financial system. The author warns that unless these legal frameworks are reexamined and reformed, they will continue to enable the transfer of wealth and assets from the many to the few, particularly during economic distress.

VII. What does Chapter VII say about “Central Clearing Parties”?

Role and Function of Central Clearing Parties

Central Clearing Parties are financial institutions that take on counterparty risk between parties to a transaction. This means that when two parties enter a trade, the CCP steps in as the buyer to the seller and the seller to the buyer, ensuring the transaction can proceed smoothly even if one party defaults. CCPs are essential in markets for derivatives, securities, and other financial instruments, providing clearing and settlement services.

CCPs are seen as a way to enhance market stability by pooling and managing the risk of all their clearing members. However, the chapter raises concerns about the potential for CCPs to fail, particularly under extreme market conditions. If a CCP fails, the consequences could be catastrophic because these entities manage and guarantee vast financial transactions globally.

Risks Associated with CCPs

The chapter discusses several risks inherent in the current structure of CCPs. One primary concern is that financial regulations have pushed more transactions into central clearing, thereby concentrating risk within these entities. While CCPs must hold sufficient capital to cover potential losses, the chapter questions whether their capitalization is adequate to withstand the failure of multiple large members simultaneously—a scenario that could occur during a severe financial crisis.

Another significant risk is the interconnectedness of CCPs with the broader financial system. CCPs are linked to various financial institutions, including banks and other CCPs, creating a web of interdependencies. This interconnectedness means that the failure of one CCP could potentially trigger a cascade of failures across the financial system, exacerbating the crisis rather than containing it.

Regulatory and Structural Concerns

The chapter also critiques the regulatory frameworks governing CCPs. While regulations require CCPs to have recovery and resolution plans in place, there is skepticism about whether these plans would be effective in a real-world crisis. The chapter points out that current regulations often assume that non-defaulting participants will continue to perform as expected, an assumption that may not hold in a widespread financial meltdown.

Moreover, the chapter suggests that the regulatory focus on protecting secured creditors may expose other stakeholders, such as smaller investors and the general public, to significant losses. In the event of a CCP failure, the assets of these less privileged stakeholders could be seized to cover the losses of the larger financial institutions, reinforcing a system that prioritizes the powerful at the expense of the vulnerable.

Potential for Systemic Failure

The chapter concludes by warning that the centralization of risk within CCPs, combined with their close ties to the global financial system, creates the potential for a systemic failure that could dwarf previous financial crises. The author argues that the financial system's reliance on CCPs, without sufficient safeguards against their failure, is a ticking time bomb that could lead to an "Everything Crash," where all financial assets collapse simultaneously.

VIII. What does Chapter VIII, “Bank Holiday,” tell us"?

This chapter explores the concept of a "Bank Holiday," drawing parallels to historical events and warning of potential future scenarios. The chapter begins by reflecting on the 1933 bank closures during the Great Depression, initiated by executive order. The author describes how the Federal Reserve, in collaboration with the Treasury, selectively allowed certain banks to reopen while thousands of others were permanently closed. This selective reopening resulted in significant losses for those with bank deposits that were not chosen to reopen, leading to widespread economic devastation.

The chapter emphasizes that the Federal Reserve’s actions during this period were not merely reactionary but part of a deliberate strategy to consolidate power and assets. The closure of banks led to a situation where debts remained, but cash and savings were wiped out, causing many to lose their homes, businesses, and other financed assets. The author argues that this event was a critical moment in a broader plan to concentrate financial control within a select group of institutions.

The text also explores the potential for a similar scenario in the future, suggesting that the infrastructure for another "Bank Holiday" is already in place. The author warns that the current financial system, with its intricate web of derivatives and holding companies, is designed to protect the interests of large financial institutions at the expense of ordinary depositors. The chapter speculates that in the event of another financial crisis, the Federal Reserve could once again orchestrate a bank closure event, this time under the guise of preventing a systemic collapse.

The chapter concludes by reflecting on the enduring impact of the 1933 Bank Holiday, arguing that it was not just a response to a crisis but a calculated move to shift economic power. The author implies that similar strategies are being prepared for the future, aiming to consolidate control over global financial assets and reduce the general population's economic resilience.

IX. What does Chapter IX on “The Great Deflation” say?

Understanding Deflation

The chapter defines deflation as a sustained decrease in the general price level of goods and services. While inflation erodes the value of money over time, deflation increases its value, making debt more expensive and potentially crippling for those who owe money. The chapter suggests that the upcoming deflation will be of a magnitude not seen since the Great Depression, fundamentally altering the economic landscape.

Historical Context and Parallels

Drawing parallels with the Great Depression of the 1930s, the author describes how deflation during that period wiped out wealth and led to widespread bankruptcies. The chapter provides historical examples, such as the collapse of real estate prices and the long-term devaluation of assets, to illustrate how devastating deflation can be. It argues that the coming deflation will be even more severe due to the massive build-up of debt in the global economy.

The Role of Debt in Deflation

A central theme of the chapter is the role of debt in exacerbating deflationary pressures. The author explains that in a deflationary environment, the real debt burden increases as the value of money rises. This leads to a vicious cycle where individuals and businesses, unable to service their debts, are forced to liquidate assets at ever-lower prices, further driving down the overall price level. The chapter suggests that this dynamic is predictable and has been deliberately set in motion by financial elites who stand to gain from the widespread devaluation of assets.

The "Everything Bubble"

The chapter also discusses the concept of the "Everything Bubble," a term used to describe the simultaneous inflation of asset prices across multiple markets, including stocks, bonds, real estate, and commodities. The author argues that this bubble has been inflated by years of loose monetary policy and will inevitably burst, leading to the Great Deflation. When this happens, the value of all these assets will plummet, leading to a massive transfer of wealth from the many to the few positioned to profit from the collapse.

Consequences of the Great Deflation

The chapter paints a grim picture of the consequences of the Great Deflation. It predicts widespread bankruptcies, mass unemployment, and the collapse of entire industries. The author warns that individuals and businesses that are heavily indebted will be particularly vulnerable, as they will be unable to repay their debts or maintain their operations. In contrast, those who hold cash or have access to large capital reserves can buy up assets at distressed prices, further consolidating their power and influence.

Strategic Implications

The chapter concludes by suggesting that the Great Deflation is part of a broader strategy by powerful financial interests to reshape the global economy in their favor. By engineering a deflationary collapse, these entities can seize control of assets, eliminate competition, and impose a new economic order that benefits them at the expense of the broader population. The author calls for greater awareness of these dynamics and urges individuals to prepare for deflation by reducing debt and securing their financial position.

X. What does Chapter X, the “Conclusion,” tell us?

Recognition of the Power Structure

The chapter begins by asserting that the powerful entities orchestrating the "Great Taking" operate under a veil of anonymity, enabled by modern social organization's vast and impersonal scale. The author argues that this anonymity has allowed these entities to avoid accountability and continue their operations without significant public resistance. However, the chapter expresses optimism that the public increasingly recognizes their nature and objectives.

Call for Non-Violent Dismantling

Most of the conclusion is dedicated to advocating for the non-violent dismantling of the power structures identified throughout the book. The author suggests that while the "masterminds" behind the global financial manipulation may remain hidden, the individuals and organizations executing their plans—those near the "levers of power"—can be identified and held accountable. The chapter calls for direct and personal action, encouraging people to document the actions of these functionaries and put them on notice that they are being watched and may be subject to future prosecution.

The Importance of a Small, Activated Group

The author emphasizes that mobilizing most of the population to effect change is unnecessary. Instead, a small, intelligent, and capable group of activated individuals can create a significant impact. This group, which the author describes as representing "the 0.01%" of the population, can leverage their knowledge and skills to challenge the much larger but less organized majority who are currently complacent or unaware of the issues.

The Inevitability of Exposure

The conclusion suggests that if the people behind the "Great Taking" persist in their actions, they will inevitably be exposed. The author expresses confidence that it will be straightforward to trace the flow of collateral and assets to those who have orchestrated their seizure, revealing the true architects of the financial schemes described in the book.

Final Reflection

The chapter ends on a reflective note, quoting John F. Kennedy: "Our problems are man-made; therefore, they can be solved by man." This quote underscores the author's belief that the challenges posed by the "Great Taking" are not insurmountable. With awareness, action, and persistence, the power structures can be dismantled, and the harm they have caused can be reversed.

XI. What does The X Project Guy have to say?

Given the length of this article, I will keep these final two sections short. Some may already think this should be called “The Great Conspiracy Theory.” I don’t blame you, as I thought that frequently at the beginning of the book. However, I checked enough of the author’s fifty-five references to keep reading. He presents compelling evidence to support his assertions about how things work and is set to work under a financial crisis scenario. His assertion regarding the intent to engineer a financial crisis as a deliberate act by the powers that be behind the largest financial institutions to gain more assets, power, and control is impossible to prove.

I know that rehypothecation is real. Warren Buffett famously wrote in his 2002 annual letter to shareholders, “derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.” A financial crisis is inevitable and will happen again at some point. Will it be worse than 2008? Given the continuing expansion of rehypothecation and the use of derivatives, yes—I think it will likely be much worse than 2008 whenever it happens.

Do I believe “the great taking” will happen? I don’t know for sure, but I think the probability is not insignificant and large enough that I felt compelled to share this with everyone.

XII. Why should you care?

Let’s say you agree that the probability of “the great taking” happening within the next 5-15 years is 10%, or maybe even 25%. Are you willing to risk 10 - 25% of your 401(k), stock portfolio, and other investment accounts? As a GenXer, I am not.

So, what am I doing to protect myself against this possibility? The first three of the ten investment themes that I subscribe to will likely protect me, but let me be a little more specific about how I approach them:

1. Overweight cash and short-term U.S. T-bills for optionality, given the expected volatility related to the rest of my investment themes.

   1. I use a TreasuryDirect account, which is exactly what it implies. It is an account outside of the banking or financial system that is direct with the U.S. Treasury, where I maintain a portfolio of short-term T-bills currently yielding above 5%.

2. Bullish gold and gold miner equities

   1. Half of my growing position in gold is held in physical gold coins that I keep in my own safe on my own property. There is no counter-party risk at all to the gold that I own and keep in my own possession.

3. Bullish Bitcoin

   1. I currently have a small Bitcoin position, as I took profits earlier this summer. I am looking to accumulate a lot more Bitcoin at lower prices based on this advice:

      1. https://x.com/NorthstarCharts/status/1824163157922738329

      2. https://x.com/NorthstarCharts/status/1822595838700384635

   2. I use Coinbase to buy Bitcoin, which I then transfer to a self-custody hardware wallet to protect against counter-party risk. You can learn more about how to do that here.

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